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Abstract 
Current thinking on the role of emotions in decision making has been highly 
influenced by one theory – the Somatic Marker Hypothesis which emphasizes the role of 
physiological mechanisms in guiding decisions – and by variants of a single task – the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT) whose development is closely tied to that theory. To address potential 
shortcomings in the IGT, we use three variants of another task – the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task – as a novel means of testing the SMH via behavioural and physiological arousal (skin 
conductance) data. We manipulated the emotional content of the task by altering its framing 
(loss vs. gain) and point of commitment to taking risk (in advance vs. in the moment), whilst 
also assessing skin conductance. We find consistent support for elements of the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis: decisions ending in failure result in higher skin conductance than 
successes; and those failures inhibit risk taking on subsequent trials. However, we find little 
support for skin conductance guiding decision making – a core prediction of the SMH.  
 
 
Keywords: sequential risk taking, Iowa gambling task, Balloon analogue risk task, 
skin conductance, emotion 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1991; 1994; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio & Anderson, 1994) proposes that signals from the body, such as elevated heart rate 
and sweating, manifest themselves during decisions under uncertainty. These somatic states 
are activated by re-encountering a response option that had previously created the somatic 
state via punishment or reward, and act to warn the decision maker against previously 
encountered disadvantageous courses of action (Damasio, 1991). The SMH was developed to 
explain acquired deficits in decision making in patients with damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC); the proposed area for storage of these somatic markers 
(Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1991).  
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, et al., 1994) was the laboratory task devised 
to capture VMPFC lesion patients’ real-life risk taking based on immediate gratification. 
Four decks of cards deliver a hypothetical $-payoff when selected: two “good” decks return 
net outcomes of $250 over 10 cards, and two “bad” decks deliver negative net outcomes of 
$250 over 10 cards. The goal is to earn as much money as possible in 100 card selections: to 
be successful, participants must learn to forgo the immediate higher rewards of the bad decks 
in order to avoid the delayed higher punishments. According to the SMH, healthy participants 
learn to do this with experience by developing outcome somatic markers in response to high 
punishments in the bad decks. Over time, anticipatory markers develop before selecting (or 
considering selecting) from a bad deck, warning the player about the poor expected 
outcomes, causing a shift to selecting the good decks. VMPFC lesion patients, however, fail 
to convert the outcome somatic markers into anticipatory markers and continue to select the 
bad decks (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996).  
Support for the SMH rests on identifying these somatic markers, which have most 
commonly been assessed by measuring skin conductance responses (SCRs) before 
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(“anticipatory”) and after (“outcome”) each card selection. Bechara et al. (1996) found that 
healthy participants who perform well in the IGT showed elevated anticipatory SCRs when 
selecting from bad decks; whereas patients with VMPFC damage who performed poorly, did 
not. Many other studies have found support for healthy individuals developing anticipatory 
SCRs (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000). 
Others have found variability in task performance and skin conductance among healthy 
controls. Bechara, Dolan, Denburg, Hindes, Anderson and Nathan (2001) found 13 out of 40 
control participants performed no better than the highest performing VMPFC patient. Control 
participants with impaired IGT performance in Bechara and Damasio (2002) showed 
variability in their anticipatory SCRs, with some comparable to the VMPFC lesion patients. 
Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa and Shigemasu (2003) divided participants by SCR magnitude, and 
found fewer selections from the bad decks for the high-SCR than the low-SCR group but 
only in later trials. Crone, Somsen, Van Beek and Van der Molen (2004) found that poor 
performers showed no such differences in their anticipatory SCRs for good and bad decks. 
Recently, Fernie and Tunney (2013) found a lack of differential anticipatory SCRs did not 
hinder successful play in the IGT.   
The IGT has been criticized (see Dunn, Dalgleish & Lawrence, 2006 for review). 
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann and Wagenmakers (2013) question the standard 
interpretation of the IGT literature, noting that healthy participants often perform poorly, 
challenging the SMH, which predicts that healthy participants learn to choose well. This 
highlights that interpreting the data from the IGT in relation to the SMH is often not 
straightforward, and that the current state of affairs where a single task is the major source of 
data on the SMH is far from ideal.  
In this paper, we apply the SMH to a sequential risk-taking task in which (as in the 
IGT) participants learn from experience. We test the SMH using the Balloon Analogue Risk 
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Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) where participants inflate a virtual balloon and accrue 
money/points for each additional “pump” of the balloon, but lose these earnings if the balloon 
bursts before they decide to stop pumping and “bank” their earnings. We believe that 
physiological data during the BART has only been published by Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez 
and Robinson (2005) who found no relationship between the mean SC level (across an entire 
task) and risk taking. However, this ignores the trial-by-trial variation in physiological 
responses, as assessed in the IGT, and which the SMH predicts should occur. We therefore 
examine whether – in line with the SMH – physiological signals guide decisions in the 
BART.  
STUDY 1 
Using a standard BART with the addition of skin conductance (SC) measurement, we 
assess participants’ physiological responses to successes (banking one’s accrued points) and 
failures (not banking and therefore losing points when the balloon bursts) and whether these 
predict subsequent actions. We test three hypotheses derived from the SMH. First, as in the 
IGT where punishment cards elicit higher outcome SC than other cards, failures should elicit 
stronger physiological responses than successes. This first analysis is, in part, a manipulation 
check to ensure arousal is greater for a failure than a success. Therefore, we predict: 
H1: Outcome SC will be greater for failures (non-banks) than for successes (banks).  
 Greater physiological arousal in response to bad outcomes (H1) should serve to warn 
against repeating poor courses of action, and greater arousal should guide behaviour more 
strongly (e.g., Carter & Smith Pasqualini, 2004); therefore, we predict:  
H2: The larger the outcome SC on the previous trial the lower the number of pumps on the 
current trial.  
Finally, the SMH posits that not only do somatic signals mark outcomes and guide 
actions, but also that they do so by becoming associated with the anticipation of bad 
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outcomes when a course of action is being considered. In order to examine this anticipatory 
SC in the BART, we examine the final decision of each trial, in which the participants elects 
to bank or to pump again (which, on this occasion, results in a burst), The action (strategy) in 
the BART that is most likely to become “marked” is pumping when the balloon is more 
highly inflated, because this is the action most likely to be punished with the worst possible 
outcome (a burst); and so if anticipatory markers guide action they will do so by “warning” 
the decision maker against pumping too much. We therefore predict that: 
H3: Anticipatory SC will be greater before a bank than before a non-bank (i.e., a decision to 
keep pumping), and will therefore predict the final decision of a trial. 
These three hypotheses are examined in Study 1, and again in two subsequent studies 
that alter the BART, to depress or enhance its “emotional character” in a manner designed to 
influence the formation and action of somatic markers.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-two participants (31 female) with a mean (standard deviation, SD) 
age of 20.45 (3.73) years and a range (inter-quartile range, IQR) of 18-36 (18-20) years took 
part. Four further participants were excluded due to either failing to follow instructions or 
apparatus error, and were replaced. For all studies, participants were recruited from the 
Psychology Department’s Volunteer list at the University of Essex (UK). Sample sizes were 
set, in advance, to be towards the upper range of that typical for physiological studies of 
decision making but a multiple of six to accommodate six counterbalanced block orders. No 
other conditions were included or dropped from analyses of this or Studies 2 and 3. 
Apparatus and task. The SC activity was recorded using a Mind Media NeXus-10, 
using a sampling rate of 32 samples per second. SC activity was recorded continuously, and a 
trigger marked the SC reading at the end of every trial (when the balloon burst or the 
participant banked). The SC data were analysed using Ledalab, (Benedek & Kaernbach, 
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2010) using continuous decomposition analysis (fitting to each participant individually) with 
no down-sampling of the data. Data were analysed using Stata in all three studies.  
On each trial of the BART, participants pumped a balloon by clicking the “Press to 
Pump” button using the computer’s mouse, collecting 1 point for every pump. Each pump 
increased the balloon by 3 pixels in height and width. The points accrued (so far) on the 
current trial, and the points earned on the previous trial were also displayed. To bank their 
points, participants clicked the “Press to Collect” button. Sound effects accompanied the end 
of each trial: either a “coin rattle” or a “balloon pop”, as appropriate. There were 30 trials.  
Each trial had a predetermined burst point and if the number of pumps reached that 
number, the balloon “popped” and any points accumulated were lost. The burst points were 
drawn at random from a uniform [1,128] distribution, with the 10th burst point in each 10-trial 
block fixed to ensure a mean burst point of 64 in the block. This procedure matched previous 
instantiations of the BART (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002), and ensures that each block can provide 
a similar quality of feedback on the task structure (Walasek, Wright & Rakow, 2014). The 
presentation order of the three blocks was counterbalanced across participants (six different 
orders). The order of the burst points was fixed within each block (i.e., not randomized).  
Procedure. Participants completed the BART after another risk taking task (not 
reported here). The study lasted approximately 30 minutes; participants received a 
performance-contingent payment of UK£0.50 for every 500 points, plus a show-up fee of £5 
(or course credit).The (gelled) sensors were attached to the distal phalange of the first and 
third digits of the participant’s non-dominant hand and their hand was placed palm upwards 
and asked to keep it as still as possible. As recommended, the sensors were given 5 minutes 
to settle and a baseline measurement was taken (Figner & Murphy, 2011). There was no time 
constraint on how quickly participants could pump but the inter-trial interval (i.e., between 
balloons) was set to 8 seconds. 
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Measures and data analyses techniques. The measure of SC was the mean phasic 
driver within the response window1: in the interval from 1 to 4 seconds after the trial outcome 
(bank or burst) for outcome SC; and within the 2 seconds prior to the trial outcome for the 
anticipatory SC. All trials were analysed (i.e., not only those that end in a bank, as is often the 
case). We analysed the number of pumps on each trial and how each trial ended (bank or 
non-bank). Due to the repeated-measures design, all regressions (here and in Studies 2 and 3) 
were run using a multilevel random intercepts regression model fit using maximum 
likelihood estimation (Nezlek, Schröder-Abe, & Schütz, 2006). This technique allows us to 
examine trial-by-trial data in a principled fashion (e.g., by not treating trials as if they were 
independent observations) and this regression approach is, we argue, particularly useful for 
testing the causal role of somatic markers that the SMH posits because SC can be used as a 
predictor variable (alongside other predictors, if desired)2.  
Research has shown both inter- and intra-individual variability in the rise and 
recovery time of SCRs (Breault & Ducharme, 1993; Edelberg & Muller, 1981); which we 
accounted for by entering participant as a random intercept at level 2 within the multilevel 
model, and included random slopes for SC (when used as a predictor). Individual repeated 
judgments entered at level 1 (29-30 data points in this study) included participants’ scores on 
the BART (number of pumps on the current trial; the previous trial outcome) and SC 
measures (previous trial outcome SC). The dependent variable was either the outcome SC 
(H1), or the number of pumps per trial (H2) or the final decision of a trial (H3). We checked 
                                                        
1 Ledalab documentation states this variable “represents phasic activity within the response window most 
accurately, but does not fall back on classic SCR amplitudes” (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010). 
2 Conversely, the standard analysis of anticipatory SC in the IGT treats SC as a dependent variable in an 
ANOVA model, and the deck selection that follows as an independent variable. This makes it hard to rule 
out epiphenomenal accounts of SCRs, whereby, for example, previous outcomes predict outcome SC and 
also predict future decisions, but outcome SC plays no causal role in future decisions. In contrast, 
multilevel modeling allows us control for previous outcome when testing the (predictive) effect of 
outcome SC on future behaviour. 
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for skew in the continuous dependent variables for each participant individually for each 
regression. Outcome SC was positively skewed, so was log10 transformed for all participants. 
Any marginal means reported for the skew-corrected data are the log-transformed scores. We 
identified multivariate outliers in our set of predictor variables, and removed those outliers 
from all regression analyses (Billor, Hadi & Velleman, 1999). No other measures were 
collected but not reported here, or in Studies 2 and 3. 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 1 summarises the distribution of each dependent variable. 
Table 1. Study 1: Mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum scores for non-skew 
corrected variables. 
 Number of pumps 
per trial 
Adjusted number 
of pumps  
Total number of 
bursts (/30) 
Outcome SC 
(Siemens/sec) 
Mean 27.65 29.36 5.36 0.95 
SD 15.47 15.77 3.50 0.98 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 91 115 19 4.64 
Summary measures are across trials except for number of bursts (/30), which is across participants. Outcome SC 
scores summarized here are not corrected for skew, but were corrected for skew when analysed as a dependent 
variable via regression. 
Multilevel analyses for H1. First, we regressed outcome SC on participant as a level 2 
variable (Model 1) and then outcome SC on trial outcome (Model 2), see Table S1 in online 
supplementary materials. Model 1 revealed significant between-participant variation about 
the grand mean, with 51% of the error variance associated with participant (intra-cluster 
correlation, ICC). Model 2 showed that participants’ outcome SC was significantly and 
substantially greater after a non-bank than a bank, b = -.45, z = -18.24, p < .001, supporting 
H1.  
Multilevel analyses for H2. We initially regressed pumps per trial on participant as a 
level 2 variable (Model 1) and then regressed pumps per trial on previous trial outcome 
(Model 2) to control for the effect of the trial outcome (see Table S2 in online supplementary 
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materials). The coefficient of the grand mean intercept in Model 1 corresponded to an 
average of 27.70 pumps per trial, reflecting risk aversion (64 pumps per trial maximizes 
expected value); 19% of the error variance in the random part of the model was associated 
with participant. Model 2 shows that participants pumped more when the previous trial had 
ended in a bank, b = 5.11, z = 5.85, p < .001, with approximately five more pumps following 
a bank than following a non-bank. This was expected, because BART participants typically 
pump more following a bank than a burst (e.g., Wallsten, Pleskac & Lejuez, 2005). 
To examine the influence of SC on pumping (H2), previous SC outcome (variable 
centered) was added as a predictor (Model 3). Higher outcome SC resulted in fewer pumps 
on the next trial, b = -1.48, z = -2.96, p = .003. Thus, over and above the effect of how the 
previous trial ended, when participants experience high SC they tend to pump less on the next 
trial, supporting H2. The interaction between previous trial outcome and previous outcome 
SC was entered (Model 4; continuous variable centered) but was not significant, z < 1; this 
addition did not significantly improve the model (p = .848). 
Multilevel analyses for H3. We regressed the final decision of each trial (non-bank = 
0, bank = 1) on participant as a level 2 variable (Model 1), which confirmed that there was 
significant variation between participants (see Table S3 in online supplementary materials). 
Adding anticipatory SC as a predictor (variable centered; Model 2) we found that (supporting 
H3) for every unit (Siemens/sec) increase in anticipatory SC, the odds of the trial ending in a 
decision to bank increased by 1.39, z = 2.85, p = .004.3 To control for the length of the trial, 
we entered number of pumps (variable centered) to the next model, and found that for every 
additional pump the odds of the trial ending in a decision to bank increased by 1.04, z = 6.85, 
p < .001; while anticipatory SC remained a significant predictor, Odds = 1.40, z = 2.69, p 
                                                        
3 Here we examine the effect of anticipatory prior to controlling for the trial outcome; but we have also 
examined H3 by entering the final decision of the trial in Model 2 and anticipatory SC in Model 3 (i.e., first 
controlling for trial outcome). In all three studies, reversing the order in this way did not affect which effects 
were found.  
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= .007, further supporting H3. The interaction term (variables centered) entered in the next 
model was not significant, z < 1. 
The results from Study 1 suggest that participants differentiate the outcomes on the 
BART – marking failures (non-banks) with greater SC than successes (banks). This mirrors 
findings in the IGT and is consistent with the SMH. Both the actual outcome of the previous 
trial and the SC associated with that outcome, independently predicted participants’ behavior 
on the next trial. Bursting the balloon led to an average of five fewer pumps on the 
subsequent trial, and having higher SC decreased the number of pumps by approximately one 
pump per Siemen/second. Also, the greater the anticipatory SC, the greater the chance of 
the trial ending with a decision to bank.  
In two subsequent studies, we further investigate the role of SC in the BART as a 
means of testing the SMH, by altering features of the BART that are pertinent to the role of 
emotions in decision making. In Study 2, we devised an “Offline” version of the task, where 
the number of pumps for each balloon was stated upfront (which should dampen emotional 
reactions). In Study 3, we devised a loss-framed BART where pumping served to avoid loss 
(which should heighten emotional reactions). 
STUDY 2 
We compare an “Offline” BART, in which participants decide how many times to 
pump at the start of each trial, with the standard (“Online”) BART in which decisions can be 
made “on the fly” and “in the moment”. A similar distinction exists between the “Hot” and 
“Cold” Columbia Card Tasks (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening & Weber, 2009) where 
the number of cards to be turned over is either stated upfront with no immediate feedback, or 
participants make stepwise incremental decisions and elect when to stop picking. The Offline 
BART could be considered a less arousing version of the BART: the decision about how 
much to pump is an “advance directive” that cannot be altered in response to subsequent 
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changes in targets or confidence, and so outcomes (good or bad) are not the result of a 
decision made just a moment ago.  
A version of the BART similar to our Offline BART – the Automatic BART – was 
successfully used by Pleskac, Wallsten, Wang and Lejuez (2008) to capture the target number 
of pumps that a participant wished to make; to avoid discarding trials when computing the 
standard measure of risk taking in the BART (the mean adjusted number of pumps). Pleskac 
et al. (2008) found that the target scores in the Automatic BART closely matched the 
pumping found in the standard BART. Our rationale for using the Offline (Automatic) BART 
differs from that of Pleskac et al. (2008): we manipulate the emotional character of the BART 
to examine the role of emotions (indexed by SC) in sequential risk taking – thereby 
subjecting the SMH to further scrutiny. We conjecture that the Offline BART will be less 
arousing than the original BART, and that, therefore, the role of emotions may be 
diminished. Conversely, however, the Offline BART brings the period of deliberation closer 
to the time of the previous trial outcome and its associated outcome SC, and so it is possible 
that trial outcome and outcome SC will predict behavior in the next trial more strongly than 
in the (standard) Online BART. However, whatever the differences in the 
emotional/deliberative character of the Online and Offline versions, SC in the final seconds 
of a trial in the Offline BART (i.e., the “anticipatory” SC) can no longer guide or impact the 
decision to stop pumping.  
We test the same three hypotheses set out in Study 1 but expect more pronounced 
emotional reactions in the Online BART compared to the Offline. We predict higher SC in 
response to failures in the Online BART, reflecting both the disappointment of a bad outcome 
and the regret associated with a very recent decision. In contrast, while one may still regret 
one’s decision in the Offline BART, the relevant decision is more distant and less likely to 
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elicit extreme reactions, again acting as a manipulation check on the levels of arousal elicited. 
Thus, we examine a modification of H1:  
H1a: Outcome SC will be greater for failures (non-banks) than for successes (banks), and 
more so in the Online BART. 
 We will also examine whether task version moderates the effects predicted in H2 
(greater previous outcome SC leading to fewer pumps on the next trial). However, we have 
competing predictions (discussed above): the deliberative character of the Offline BART may 
reduce this effect, or bringing the decision about how much risk to take closer to the previous 
outcome in the Offline BART may amplify the effect.  
 Given anticipatory SC in the final moments of the trial cannot alter the decision that 
was made some seconds earlier in the Offline BART, we have a clear prediction that the task 
version will moderate the effect:   
H3a: Anticipatory SC will be greater before a bank than before a non-bank, and will therefore 
predict the final decision of a trial in the Online BART, but not in the Offline BART. 
Method 
Participants. There were 36 participants (23 female) with a mean (SD) age of 24.33 
(3.80) years and a range (IQR) of 19-35 (22-26) years. Two further participants were 
excluded due to not following instructions correctly or apparatus error, and were replaced. 
 Apparatus and task. The version of the BART from Study 1 was used with some 
modifications. Participants had to click a button labelled “Click to start pumping” at the start 
of each trial just above the “Press to pump” button. To avoid very early bursts (arguably 
implausible for the balloon cover story) the burst points were set to occur between 15 to 128 
pumps, but still with a mean burst point of 64 in each block, and sound effects were removed. 
To increase participants’ awareness of the instructions, participants were instructed to click 
on the balloon displayed on the screen instead of the “next” button in order to move between 
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screens of instructions (Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009). Lastly, participants were 
shown screen shots of a balloon pumped to 25%, and 75% of the total size to help orientate 
participants to the task (Pleskac et al., 2008). The Offline BART differed only by requiring 
participants to enter the number of pumps they wished to make on each balloon (in advance) 
before they started pumping. If the specified number of pumps was reached without the 
balloon bursting, a message appeared telling them to collect their points. This ensured that all 
behavioural and physiological measures were taken at equivalent points of the two versions. 
Design. Participants completed both versions of the BART in a within-subjects design 
(with the order of versions counterbalanced, and >5 minutes between tasks). The order of the 
pre-set burst points was randomized within blocks, and block order was counterbalanced via 
a Latin square with the additional constraint that participants did not encounter the same 
initial block in both versions. 
Procedure. The session took approximately 50 minutes; participants were paid £5 
plus £0.50 for every 500 points (for both BARTs). The study setup and the measures taken 
were identical to Study 1, except that (as recommended; Figner & Murphy, 2011) participants 
completed a questionnaire filler task during the initial SC baseline-recording period.  
Results and Discussion 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of each dependent variable, for both task versions. 
Table 2. Study 2: Mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum scores for each version of 
the BART. 
 Number of 
pumps per trial 
Adjusted pumps 
per trial 
Total number of 
bursts (/30) 
Outcome SC 
(Siemens/sec) 
Online  Offline  Online Offline Online  Offline  Online  Offline  
Mean 33.87 32.12 35.02 32.69 5.30 4.81 0.72 0.47 
SD 15.07 14.52 15.03 15.71 3.48 3.43 0.92 0.68 
Minimum 4 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 105 100 105 100 18 17 4.59 4.03 
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Summary measures are across trials except for number of bursts (/30), which is across participants. Outcome SC 
scores summarized here are not corrected for skew, but were corrected for skew when analysed as a dependent 
variable via regression.  
Multilevel analyses for H1a. To examine variability in outcome SC, we first regressed 
outcome SC on participant as a level 2 variable (see Table S4 in online supplementary 
materials). This revealed that 28% of the error variance was associated with participant – 
again supporting the use of multilevel models to analyse these data. In Model 2, we regressed 
outcome SC on version (Online = 0, Offline = 1), order (Online first = 0, Offline first = 1), 
and their interaction. There was a main effect of version, with greater outcome SC in the 
Online than the Offline BART, b = -.19, z = -5.37, p < .001. There was no significant effect 
of order, or its interaction with version; therefore, order was dropped from subsequent models 
while version was retained. To test H1a, in Model 3, we added (previous) trial outcome (burst 
= 0, bank = 1) and the interaction with version as predictors. As in Study 1, outcome SC was 
substantially greater after a non-bank than a bank, b = -.50, z = -13.86, p < .001, and more so 
in the Online BART, b = .15, z = 2.96, p = .003, supporting H1a.  
Multilevel analyses for H2.We first regressed pumps per trial on participant as a level 
2 variable (see Table S5 in online supplementary materials). The coefficient of the grand 
mean intercept corresponded to 33.2 pumps on average – again indicating risk aversion, 
though less so than in Study 1. We then regressed pumps per trial on version, order 
(predictors coded as above) and their interaction term (Model 2). Only the interaction 
between version and order was significant b = -4.88, z = -3.97, p < .001. This effect in itself 
is not critical to our consideration of the SMH, but was included in all subsequent models 
together with version to allow full consideration of our design when exploring whether 
version was a moderator.  
We regressed the number of pumps per trial on previous trial outcome (non-bank = 0, 
bank = 1) and the interaction between previous trial outcome and version (Model 3). As 
found in Study 1, participants pumped more when the previous trial had ended in a bank, b = 
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3.20, z = 3.39, p = .001. Additionally, the interaction between previous trial outcome and 
version was significant, b = -3.61, z = -2.72, p = .007: matching what was found in Study 1 
participants pumped fewer times following a non-bank (Offline MMarginal = 30.21; Online 
MMarginal = 31.86) than a bank (Offline MMarginal = 33.40; Online MMarginal = 35.06). 
To examine the influence of outcome SC on subsequent pumping (H2), previous 
outcome SC and its interaction with version (continuous variables centered) were added as 
predictors (Model 4), which resulted in a marginal improvement of the overall model fit (vs. 
Model 3, p = .054). Previous outcome SC was a marginally significant predictor, b = -1.26, z 
= -1.94, p = .052, with higher SC predicting fewer pumps on the next trial; however, the 
interaction between previous outcome SC and version was significant, b = 1.68, z = 2.13, p 
= .033, with higher previous outcome SC predicting a greater number of pumps on the next 
trial in the Offline version (i.e., opposite to the direction predicted in H2) but not in the 
Online version. The significant interaction between previous trial outcome and version in 
Model 3 also became non-significant in Model 4; however the main effect of previous trial 
outcome remained, with more pumps on the next trial following a bank.   
Multilevel analyses for H3a. We regressed the final decision of each trial (non-bank = 
0, bank = 1) on participant as a level 2 variable (Model 1). We then entered anticipatory SC 
(centered; Model 2), however, unlike Study 1, it was not a significant predictor, z < 1 (see 
Table S6 in online supplementary materials). To check for effects of version and their order 
(Model 3), we regressed the final decision of the trial on version, the order of the versions, 
and their interaction, together with anticipatory SC and its interaction with version (H3a). 
None of these effects were significant (all p’s > .283); therefore we find no support for H3a. 
We then included number of pumps (variable centered) retaining version, anticipatory SC and 
their interaction (Model 4). We found that for each additional pump, the odds of the trial 
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ending in a decision to bank increased by 1.03, z = 7.73, p < .001, and all other effects 
remained non-significant, (z’s < 1.68, p’s > .093).  
STUDY 3 
The SMH predicts, and studies involving the IGT have shown, greater physiological 
responses to losses than to gains. This finding has been observed in a variety of tasks 
(Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Satterthwaite et al., 2007); and fits with the general 
observation, often reported, that negative events impact us more than positive events 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The 
BART has previously been modified to examine the effects of framing that are predicted by 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Consistent with the payoff domain effect 
(reflection effect) documented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and instantiated in their 
prospect theory value function, Benjamin and Robbins (2007) found a loss-framed BART 
produced more risk seeking behaviour. 
In Study 3 we tested the impact of framing on SC and risk taking. It is not clear 
whether this effect alone should lead us to expect a differential effect of frame on the effects 
set out in hypotheses H1 to H3. However, as discussed above, we anticipate greater emotional 
reactions to, and greater impact from, failures framed as losses than to those framed as 
foregone gains, and therefore predict: 
H1b: Outcome SC will be greater for failures (non-banks) than for successes (banks), and 
more so in the loss frame. 
Consistent with clearer somatic marking guiding action more strongly (Carter & 
Smith Pasqualini, 2004), we predict that this effect of frame on the intensity of emotional 
response will moderate the effect of outcome SC on subsequent risk taking: 
H2b: The larger the outcome SC on the previous trial the lower the number of pumps on the 
current trial, and more so in the loss frame.  
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Likewise, when events are marked more clearly by somatic states, somatic markers 
should arise more readily when the potential for those events to occur is considered at a 
subsequent point in the task. We therefore predict that:  
H3b: Anticipatory SC will be greater before a bank than before a non-bank, and will therefore 
predict the final decision of a trial, and more so in a loss frame. 
Method 
Participants. There were 36 participants (25 female) with a mean (SD) age of 22.03 
(5.88) years and a range (IQR) of 18-44 (19-23) years. Two further participants were 
excluded for not following instructions and were replaced.  
Apparatus and task. The Online BART used in Study 2 was used create the new loss-
frame and gain-frame BARTs. In the Gain BART, labels were changed to “Pumps So Far” 
and “Money Gained So Far” (which showed an increase of 1 pence with each pump). At the 
end of the trial, a label showing the “Money Gained on Balloon” was displayed, which 
showed “0 pence” if the balloon had burst. The equivalent adaptations were made to create 
the Loss BART, but changed to “Money Lost So Far” (which started at 128 pence and 
reduced by 1 pence with each pump). At the end of the trial, the “Money Lost on Balloon” 
label was displayed. If the balloon had burst, the label showed that 128 pence had been lost.  
 Design. Participants completed both versions (frames) of the BART in a within-
subjects design with frame order counterbalanced. The burst points were randomized within 
each block, and the order of the blocks was fully counterbalanced.  
 Procedure. The study lasted approximately 50 minutes. Participants were paid £5 and 
a performance-contingent payment (from one trial of each version of the BART). The 
procedure was the same as Study 2, except for the required changes to the task instructions 
(below) and screen layout (above), and a small reduction in the inter-trial interval to 6 
seconds. The additional instructions in either a loss or gain frame were modified from 
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Benjamin and Robbins (2007). Once the 3-minute baseline period was over, the experimenter 
checked the participants’ understanding of the tasks. In the Loss BART, participants were 
shown 128 pence (in coins) and told it was their money (i.e., starting balance). They were 
then asked three questions about how much they would lose from their balance if they 
pumped a specified number of times. In the Gain BART participants were shown 128 pence 
and told they could win up to this amount and were asked the same three questions but 
regarding how much they would gain. In both versions of the BART one balloon would be 
selected and the amount retained from the endowed 128 pence in the Loss BART and the 
amount gained out of the potential 128 pence in the Gain BART would be added together as 
payment; if the balloon burst on the trial selected this resulted in no payment. Participants 
completed an unrelated filler task between the two BART versions, ensuring at least 10 
minutes between the two BARTs.  
Results and Discussion 
The distributions for the dependent variables are summarized in Table 3, for each 
version (frame) of the BART. 
Table 3. Study 3: Means, standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum scores for each frame of 
the BART. 
 Number of 
pumps per trial 
Adjusted pumps 
per trial 
Total number of 
bursts (/30) 
Outcome SC 
(Siemens/sec) 
Gain  Loss  Gain Loss Gain  Loss  Gain  Loss  
Mean 41.68 43.69 46.00 49.12 7.33 7.59 0.71 0.78 
SD 20.96 22.50 22.49 24.12 4.81 4.60 0.91 0.87 
Minimum 5 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 120 128 120 120 23 22 5.49 5.56 
Summary measures are across trials except for number of bursts (/30), which is across participants. Outcome SC 
scores summarized here are not corrected for skew, but were corrected for skew when analysed as a dependent 
variable via regression. 
Multilevel analyses for H1b. We regressed SC outcome on participant as a level 2 
variable (see Table S7 in online supplementary materials). This initial model revealed that 
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60% of the error variance was associated with participant – again confirming multilevel 
modeling as appropriate. We then regressed outcome SC on frame (Loss BART = 0, Gain 
BART = 1), frame order (Loss BART first = 0, Gain BART first = 1), and their interaction 
term (Model 2). There was no main effect of frame, order effect or interaction. Consequently, 
only frame was retained as a predictor to test H1b. We regressed outcome SC on trial outcome 
and its interaction with frame (Model 3). We again found the predicted main effect of trial 
outcome, b = -.16, z = -5.24, p < .001; though the interaction between frame and trial 
outcome was not significant, b = .054, z = 1.33, p = .184. Thus, it is true that outcome SC was 
greater after non-banks (Gain BART MMarginal = -0.39, Loss BART MMarginal = -0.32) than 
after banks (Gain BART MMarginal = -0.54, Loss BART MMarginal = -0.48) supporting H1, and, 
while the marginal means were in the right direction, H1b was not supported.  
Multilevel analyses for H2b.  We first regressed the number of pumps per trial on 
participant as a level 2 variable, and found significant between-subjects variability (see Table 
S8 in online supplementary materials). The coefficient of the grand mean intercept, 
corresponded to an average of 42.99 pumps per trial; again indicative of risk aversion, but 
with greater risk taking than in Studies 1 or 2. This may reflect that, unlike Studies 1 and 2, 
participants in Study 3 could infer the maximum number of pumps; thus the typical tendency 
towards risk aversion is not further compounded by uncertainty about the properties of the 
task (see Pleskac, 2008, for sequential risk taking in ill-defined and defined environments). 
We then regressed pumps per trial on frame (loss or gain), frame order, and their interaction 
term (Model 2). Only frame was significant, with more pumps per trial in the Loss BART 
than the Gain BART, b = -3.36, z = -2.59, p = .010 (and so frame was retained in all 
subsequent models) showing greater risk seeking in the loss frame than in the gain frame. We 
added previous trial outcome and its interaction with frame as predictors (Model 3). As found 
previously, participants pumped more when the previous trial had ended in a bank, b = 3.61, z 
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= 2.76, p = .006; however, there was no interaction with frame. Thus, for the standard BART 
(as in Studies 1 and 2), participants pumped less after a non-bank than a bank – however, the 
framing did not alter this reaction to the previous outcome. 
To examine the influence of outcome SC on subsequent risk taking (H2b), previous 
outcome SC and its interaction (continuous variables centered) with frame were added in 
Model 4. There was no main effect of previous outcome SC, though the interaction between 
previous outcome SC and frame was significant, b = -1.86, z = -2.05, p = .040. Thus, higher 
outcome SC on the previous trial was associated with increased risk taking in the loss frame 
but with decreased risk taking in the gain frame (holding the other predictors constant). Thus, 
H2 was supported in the Gain BART; while the opposite direction of effect was found in the 
loss BART with higher previous SC leading to greater pumping on the next trial. 
Multilevel analyses for H3b. We first regressed the final decision of each trial (non-
bank = 0, bank = 1) on participant as a level 2 variable (again finding this model a significant 
improvement upon standard logistic regression). In Model 2, we found no effect of 
anticipatory SC when it was added as an additional predictor (centered), z < 1 (see Table S9 
in online supplementary materials). In Model 3 we tested for effects of frame and frame 
order and their interaction, together with anticipatory SC and its interaction with frame, but 
all predictors were non-significant (all p’s > .292); thus there was also no support for H3b. We 
then added number of pumps (variable centered) while retaining frame, anticipatory SC and 
their interaction (Model 4). Consistent with Studies 1 and 2 we found that for each additional 
pump the odds of the trial ending in a bank increased by 1.04, z = 14.10, p < .001. The effect 
of frame was now significant, Odds Ratio = 1.30, z = 2.24, p = .025; indicating a greater 
chance of banking at a given stage of the trial in the gain frame.  
Re-analysis according to what strategy is optimal. At the suggestion of a reviewer, we 
examined whether the predictors of the outcome SC (H1b) and the decision to stop pumping 
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(H3b) differed according to whether participants should be pumping more, or less, by 
analysing trials ending at ≤ 64 pumps separately from trials ending at ≥ 65 pumps (64 pumps 
per trial maximizes expected value). (Such analysis was not feasible for Studies 1 and 2 
because participants rarely pumped more than 64 times). These analyses yielded the same 
pattern of significant effects in respect of H1b (see Tables S7a and S7b in the online 
supplementary materials), except that for “long” trials frame was no longer a significant 
predictor in the final model. With respect to H3b, the analysis of “short” trials yielded the 
same findings as the original analysis (see Table S9a in online supplementary materials). For 
“long” trials, anticipatory SC was significantly greater prior to a decision to bank (Model 2), 
suggesting anticipatory SC plays a role later on in a trial (when the balloon is more likely to 
burst); though this effect was no longer significant when pumps per trial was also a predictor 
(Model 3, see Table S9b in online supplementary materials).  
.GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In three studies, we examined whether the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; 
Damasio, 1991; 1994) could explain behaviour in variants of the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART). Previous tests of the SMH have focused almost exclusively on variants of the 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT); we therefore derived three hypotheses from the SMH that 
allowed us to undertake much-needed tests of this prominent theory of the role of emotions in 
decision making.   
We consistently found (in all three studies) that trials ending in failure (a burst) where 
the participant had decided to continue pumping, prompted greater skin conductance (SC) 
than trials that ended in a decision to cease pumping (banking points). This result is in 
keeping with findings from the IGT, in which losses/failures elicit higher SC than gains (e.g., 
Suzuki et al., 2003); is consistent with the SMH insofar as somatic reactions to outcomes are 
necessary (though not sufficient) for the subsequent formation of anticipatory somatic 
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markers; and provides a manipulation check on our physiological data (because a burst is a 
surprising outcome). The emotional character of the task can moderate this effect of outcome 
on SC. Our Offline BART (Study 2), in which successes and failures resulted from decisions 
made well in advance of their precipitating actions, elicited lower SC in response to those 
outcomes. Additionally, the difference in outcome SC between successes and failures was 
lower in this more “emotionally detached” version of the BART than in a standard Online 
version. This is in line with differences in SC between the “Hot” and “Cold” Columbia Card 
Tasks (Figner et al., 2009). The Cold task, in which (like our Offline BART) participants 
specify “advance directives”, elicited lower SC than the Hot task. Our loss-framed BART 
(Study 3) increased the level of SC on trial outcomes compared to a gain-frame. However, 
this did not significantly moderate the effect of outcome. 
 Support for the second hypothesis (that lower risk taking would follow a higher 
outcome SC) was inconsistent; with significant support for this prediction (which was 
derived from the SMH) in Study 1 and in the Online (Study 2) and Gain (Study 3) versions of 
the BART. This pattern was confirmed in a combined analysis of H2 across all three studies 
with condition dummy coded: the (overall) main effect of outcome SC was negative as 
predicted but significantly reversed in the Offline BART and the Loss BART. A reviewer 
suggested that healthy participants might rely on somatic markers from several previous trials 
rather than only the most recent one, as has been shown to occur in the IGT (Yechiam, 
Busemeyer, Stout & Bechara, 2005). However, analyses for H2 using the average previous 
SC did not provide a clearer picture for outcome SC predicting pumping on the subsequent 
trials. The only significant effect of average previous SC was found in Study 3 where higher 
average outcome SC on previous trials was associated with increased risk taking, whilst 
controlling for average previous trial outcomes and frame. 
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Our third hypothesis tested the contentious proposition (see Dunn et al., 2006) that 
somatic markers arise when the decision maker considers a poor course of action, and serve 
to warn the decision maker away from that action. As the worst possible outcomes in the 
BART arise when one pumps too much, we predicted, based on the SMH, elevated SC just 
before the decision to stop pumping and to bank. This was found to be the case in Study 1, 
where, as hypothesized, the anticipatory SC predicted whether the participant banked or 
continued to pump. However, this finding was not replicated in any of the versions of the 
BART examined in Studies 2 and 3.  
To check whether our lack of consistent SC effects could be attributed to limited 
power in any one study, we analysed H3 for all three studies together while dummy coding 
for condition. This showed that the effect predicted in H3 was significantly larger in Study 1 
than in all other studies. Moreover, no overall effect of anticipatory SC was detected across 
Studies 2 and 3 (combined) – which, according to the SMH, should occur for three of the four 
conditions run (Offline BART excepted). It is difficult to know why H3 was corroborated in 
Study 1, but not consistently elsewhere – but our data suggest that finding an effect of 
anticipatory SC is the exception rather than the norm. 
However, looking at decisions to bank made early (prior to reaching 65 pumps) and 
late (made after reaching 64 pumps) in Study 3, anticipatory SC was greater on trials where 
participants chose to bank, compared to trials that ended in a burst for decisions made later 
on. This result suggests that it is not until later on in a trial, when the balloon is at much 
greater risk of bursting, that participants might be making use of their physiological reactions. 
It is also difficult to ascertain what level of knowledge our participants had regarding the best 
course of action in the BART. Conscious knowledge in the IGT has been assessed on a 
number of occasions (Bechara et al., 1997; Maia & McClelland, 2004) and been shown to 
vary across healthy controls; with successful players more likely to show the typical SC 
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pattern expected by the SMH compared to absent or irregular SC results for the poorer 
players. As optimal play is rare in the BART, assessing participants’ knowledge of the game 
might provide insights into their strategies and whether non-conscious strategies are needed. 
The BART elicits emotional reactions to the outcomes reported in other risk-taking 
tasks such as the IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994) and the Columbia Card Task (Figner et al., 
2009); these are readily detected via SC measurement; and can be successfully analysed on a 
trial-by-trial basis using multilevel models. The BART is therefore a suitable task for 
(further) investigating the physiological components of decision making. However, the 
predictions we derived from the SMH were corroborated by the data approximately 50% of 
the time, and H3, which spoke most directly to the unique elements of the SMH, was only 
consistently supported in Study 1. Specifically, in a sequence of decisions, the previous 
outcome predicts the amount of risk that the decision maker takes on their next decision and 
those outcomes are marked by somatic signals (H1); but the presence or size of those signals 
does not consistently predict what the decision maker does next (H2 and H3). Thus, we find 
clear evidence of physiological arousal in decisions under uncertainty, but we find little 
evidence that this guides decisions in the manner predicted by the SMH.        
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